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Abstract
This article describes the Europeanisation of Spanish administrative
law as a result of the influence of the EU law general principle of legitimate expecta-
tions. It examines, firstly, whether the formal incorporation of the principle of legiti-
mate expectations into national legislation and case law has modified the substance
of the latter, and if so, secondly, whether this has led to a weaker or a more robust
protection of the legal status quo. To carry out that examination, the article considers
the influence of the principle of legitimate expectations in two different areas: in indi-
vidual administrative decision-making, and in legislative and administrative rule-
making. Our conclusion is that the Europeanisation of Spanish administrative law
through the principle of legitimate expectations has been variable and ambiguous.
1. Introduction
This article explores the Europeanisation of Spanish adminis-
trative law, in particular through the influence of the principle of legitimate
expectations, a ‘general principle’ of EU law. Europeanisation is a process of
transformation of national principles, rules and doctrines as a consequence of
European – in this article mainly, EU law. Europeanisation can be seen as
emerging for two different reasons. Firstly, it often arises from the duty to adopt
or adapt domestic administrative law to be in line with EU legislation as it
evolves, and to align with or comply with case law of the Court of Justice, in
particular areas of administration. Secondly, through the application of general
principles of EU law. General principles can lead to a broader and deeper influ-
ence in domestic legal systems because they are not restricted to particular areas
of law or to a specific instrument of administrative action: they have horizontal
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and cross-sectional effects, and often apply abstractly, as part of a doctrine, and
through administrative law instruments that have a structural nature.
Both the legal value and content of any given EU law general principle is
the same in all the EU Member States. This is a consequence of the requirement
of uniformity in EU law. Nevertheless, in practice, Europeanisation occurs
rather differently in each of the Member States; The same general principle of
EU law can actually influence various national legal orders differently, not only
in terms of the extent of transformation that it causes, but also in view of the
pieces or building blocks of the domestic legal order that will possibly be affected.
Those differences are not directly due to the principle; they ultimately depend
on the particular nature of the national legal order which applies the principle.
A plausible working hypothesis might be that the same general principle of EU
law may produce different consequences in one Member State compared to
another depending on the following criteria: (i) the degree to which domestic
administrative law is constrained by domestic constitutional law; (ii) whether
administrative law is subject to a more or less formalistic legislative codification;
(iii) how rigid or flexible both administrative law rule-making and judicial pre-
cedent are; and (iv) how open and cosmopolitan the administrative law system
and its legal culture are.
This article is not intended to discuss the principle of legitimate expectations
protection as a matter of EU law,1 nor it is aimed at making a contribution in
this latter field. Rather, we will describe the influence that EU law has had in
Spanish administrative law. Taking this influence as a case-study is particularly
useful because it allows more than just an observation of how it has unfolded
in that Member State, it also makes possible to verify the said hypothesis more
broadly, and ultimately to compare this particular experience with that of other
Member States’ legal orders. Turning to the structure, this article aims to answer
two specific research questions. The first is whether the formal incorporation
of the principle of legitimate expectations into Spanish administrative law has
modified the substance of the latter. The second, if the answer to the latter is
yes, is whether this has led to a weaker or to a more robust protection of the
stability of the legal status quo. In order to address these two questions, this
paper will assess the impact of the EU law principle of legitimate expectations
in two different areas: when expectations are frustrated by individual adminis-
See R Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (Hart 2000)
(Thomas); S Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (OUP 2000) (Schønberg);
1
H-J Blanke, Vertrauenschutz in deutschen und europäischen Verwaltungsrecht (Mohr Siebeck
2001); T Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (OUP 2006); X Groussot, General Principles
of Community Law (Europa Law Publishing 2006), 202-214; D Dero-Bugni, ‘Les principes de
sécurité juridique et de confiance légitime’, in J-B Auby and JD de la Rochère (eds), Traite du
droit administrative européen (Bruylant 2014), 651-670.
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trative decisions (section 3), and when they are frustrated by legislative or ad-
ministrative rules (section 4). Then the article will focus on a specific develop-
ment in Spanish (Supreme Court) case law in the area of State liability for
damages caused by Parliamentary laws, where the EU law principle of legitimate
expectations has allegedly played an important role (section 5). Before doing
so, there must first be a preliminary discussion of how the principle was received
in national administrative law (section 2).
2. Incorporation of the principle of legitimate
expectations in Spain
Article 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution lists the principle of
legal certainty among a number of other principles, which have always been
connected to the rule of law:
‘The Constitution guarantees the principle of legality, the hierarchy of legal
provisions, the publicity of legal statutes, the principle of legal certainty and the
non-retroactivity of both non-favourable punitive provisions and provisions re-
strictive of individual rights, the rule of law, the accountability of public author-
ities, and the prohibition of arbitrary action of public authorities’.
Nevertheless, there has never been any expression of legal certainty in the
form of the legal protection of legitimate expectations in any statutory instrument
or judgment. Not even the term ‘legitimate expectations’ itself, or others more
or less equivalent to it, such as ‘legitimate confidence’, or ‘legitimate trust’ have
appeared in that context.
The first time it was mentioned was in a judgment of the Supreme Court
of 1989: a private school applied for a subsidy which was refused by the admin-
istrative authority in an administrative decision. However, it had in fact granted
that subsidy to the same applicant in the previous period of the school year,
which had created expectations for the school, and the rejection was therefore
held to frustrate those expectations:
‘With the rejection of the subsidy application the ‘fides’ or trust of the appli-
cant was broken in a case in which the latter was performing a burdensome
activity of public interest under the expectation that the new subsidy was going
to be granted just like the previous one […] It is therefore a requirement of good
faith to believe that once a subsidy for the first period of the school year has
been granted, the subsidy for the next periods of the same school year will also
be granted, provided that circumstances remain the same’.2
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court quashed the administrative decision and
declared the right of the private school to receive the subsidy for the remainder
of the school year. This ruling seems to ground the protection of the legal status
quo on the notion of good faith – which had been traditionally proclaimed as a
general principle of law in Article 6.1 of the Civil Code. It also seems to be based
on the principle of nemoauditur propriam turpitudinem allegans – which has al-
ways been a topos used very widely in legal reasoning. However, there was no
reference or basis on the constitutional principle of legal certainty. The expres-
sion ‘legitimate expectations’ is not even used by the Court. Nevertheless, the
underlying principle is that an expectation which the applicant could reasonably
rely on had been created by the previous administrative decision, and that it
was unlawful for the same authority to frustrate those expectations.
This ruling was paid immediate attention in academic literature, and various
case notes pointed to the German public law principle of Vertrauensschutz as
the principle of law that was being applied in this ruling.3 Very shortly after,
the Supreme Court handed down two new judgments that helped to consolidate
the principle, as well as to clarify its legal context.4 One of them, also concerning
an administrative decision rejecting a subsidy that a private school had applied
for, said that:
‘In the conflict between the principles of legality of administrative action
and of legal certainty, the latter prevails by virtue of the protection of legitimate
expectations, which has been implicitly proclaimed by this Court in its Judgment
of 28 February 1989 (RJ 1989/1458). While having its origins in the law of the
Federal Republic of Germany, it has also been recognised in the case law of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities, of which Spain is a Member
State. The principle does not depend on the mere psychological belief of the
beneficiary, but rather requires the expectations to be based on external signs
coming from the Administration that are conclusive enough to reasonably induce
him to rely on the legality of the administrative action [and that the administra-
tive act] causes damage to the beneficiary due to the investments that he previ-
ously made’.5
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of 28 February 1989
(RJ 1989/1458), para 2.
2
F Marín Riaño, ‘La recepción del principio de la confianza legítima en la jurisprudencia del
Tribunal Supremo’ (1989) 2 La Ley 605.
3
Judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of 26 January 1990
(RJ 1990/598), and of 1 February 1990 (RJ 1990/1258). J Quesada Lumbreras, ‘Tres décadas
4
de protección jurisprudencial de la confianza legítima’ (2010) 146 Revista Española de Derecho
Administrativo 417.
RJ 1990/1258 (n 4), para 2.5
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Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court acknowledges the structure of the
‘legal transplant’ that is grounded in the authority of EC law, which can be
traced back to German public law. As a matter of fact, subsequent academic
scholarship has resorted directly to the latter,6 at least as much as it has to the
case law of the Court of Justice,7 in seeking clarification of the factual conditions
of application and the legal effects of this principle. It is uncertain which of
these two sources was more influential in the development of the Supreme
Court’s doctrine on legitimate expectations in the three subsequent decades.
In other words, while formally the legal influence has come through the case
law of the Court of Justice, from a substantive perspective it is not at all clear
whether we have witnessed a more horizontal (from a neighbouring Member
State’s legal order) than vertical (from the EU legal order) legal transplant. In-
deed, as it will be demonstrated next, the respective importance of these sources
might well vary depending on which dimension of legitimate expectations’
protection is at stake.
The torch for the development of the principle was then taken by the Spanish
Parliament. In 1999 it amended the 1992 Administrative Procedure Act,8 so
that the new wording of Article 3 established that administrative bodies:
‘shall comply with the principles of good faith and legitimate expectations’.
F Castillo Blanco, La protección de la confianza en el Derecho administrativo (Marcial Pons 1999)
(Castillo Blanco); J García Luengo, El principio de protección de la confianza en el Derecho admin-
6
istrativo (Marcial Pons 2002) (García Luengo); S Díez Sastre, El precedente administrativo
(Marcial Pons) 2008 (Díez Sastre); J García Luengo, ‘El principio de protección de la confianza’
in JA Santamaría Pastor (ed), Los principios jurídicos del Derecho administrativo (La Ley 2010),
1167-1205; T Müller, Die Europäiesierung der Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetze in Deutschland und
Spanien (Mohr Siebeck 2019), 44.
See R García Macho, ‘Contenido y límites del principio de protección de la confianza legítima:
estudio sistemático de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia’ (1987) 57 Revista Española
7
de Derecho Administrativo 557, 557-571; S Muñoz Machado, ‘Regulación y confianza legítima’
(2016) 200 Revista de Administración Pública 141 (Muñoz Machado); R Alonso García, ‘Treinta
años de ius publicum commune en España’ (2016) 200 Revista de Administración Pública 341.
Act No. 30/1992, of 26 November 1992, on Public Administration and Common Administrative
Procedure (Official Journal No. 285, of 27 November 1992, 40300-40319) (Act No. 30/1992),
8
as amended by Act No. 4/1999, of 13 January 1999 (Official Journal No. 12, of 14 January 1999,
1739-1755) (Act No. 4/1999).
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The preamble of the 1999 amendment declared that it incorporates into the
statute:
‘two new general principles of administrative action that stem from legal
security. On the one hand, the principle of good faith ... On the other, the
principle of legitimate expectations, which protects citizens against their arbitrary
frustration by administrative authorities. The second one is well established in
European administrative procedural law, as well as in national administrative
law case law’.9
Since 1999, therefore, protection of legitimate expectations has been pro-
claimed as a general or horizontal principle of law which applies to statutes, as
well as administrative rules and individual administrative decisions. The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act does not, however, define the conditions for the
principle to apply, nor what remedies would apply in the event of a violation of
the principle. In particular, it doesn’t specify when the latter could lead to an
action for annulment and/or to a claim for damages – i.e., when the principle
grants substantive or compensatory protection.10 Some authors consider that
compensation should be the single effect of the violation of the principle of
protection of legitimate expectations, especially when it collides with the prin-
ciple of legality.11 In turn, the mentioned rulings of the Supreme Court invalidate
otherwise lawful administrative decisions by virtue of the principle of legitimate
expectations. In these cases, the individual may additionally have a right to be
compensated for damages caused by an unlawful administrative decision,12 and
compensation would thus not function as a substitute for annulment, but as
an additional legal consequence arising from the principle of legitimate expec-
tations. This implies that, under this case-law, the latter grants both substantive
and compensatory protection. Moreover, some authors argue that the principle
can also prevent the public administration from eliminating an illegal situation
favorable to an individual, and even force it to maintain contra legem an illegal
favorable act, either on a general basis,13 or exceptionally.14 German jurisprudence
on the conservation of favorable illegal administrative acts, such as social secu-
rity benefits,15 seems to have exerted more influence on Spanish case law and
Act No. 4/1999 (n 8), Preamble, Section II.9
See Schønberg (n 1) passim.10
L Medina Alcoz, ‘Confianza legítima y responsabilidad patrimonial’ (2006) 130 Revista Española
de Derecho Administrativo 290 (Medina Alcoz).
11
1978 Spanish Constitution (Spanish Constitution), art 106(2).12
Castillo Blanco (n 6), 288; García Luengo (n 6), 430.13
Díez Sastre (n 6), 400-404.14
The leading case, regarding the conservation of an illegal widow’s pension, is the Judgment
of the Berlin OVG of 14.11.1956. See H Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (C. H. Beck 2004)
274.
15
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academic doctrine than the Court of Justice, at least in regards to the question
of remedies.16
This is the story of the formal or apparent incorporation of the principle
into the domestic legal order. Nevertheless, long before 1989, Spanish public
law had already dealt with the whole set of problems typically connected to the
principle of legitimate expectations, such as the withdrawal of administrative
acts, self-limitation of administrative authorities, and retroactivity. As a matter
of fact, within the different layers of Spanish public law, a thick and refined
network of solutions to those problems could be found. One of the sources was
Article 9.3 of the 1978 Constitution, which, along with the principle of legal
certainty, also stated the non-retroactivity of both non-favourable punitive pro-
visions and provisions restrictive of individual rights.17 As we will see later, the
Spanish Constitutional Court initially reviewed legislation that had retroactive
effect using a formalistic approach, by simply trying to determine the meaning
of the terms ‘provisions’, ‘non-retroactivity’, and ‘restrictive of individual rights’.
On another level, the 1958 Administrative Procedure Act already contained a
detailed regulation of what would occur in the event of withdrawal of both ad-
verse and favourable individual administrative decisions.18 The principle of
legal certainty worked through this particular set of rules, and the courts did
not use the constitutional principle of legal certainty in order to qualify them.19
Finally, despite lacking specific regulation by statute, the case law of adminis-
trative law courts had dealt with the typical forms of administrative self-limita-
tion, such as administrative precedents,20 and answers given by administrative
authorities to consultations made by individuals or firms – which were subject
to well-established case law, especially in the field of private-project develop-
ment.21 In view of this situation, it makes sense to assess whether the latter has
made an actual difference in Spanish administrative law, and, if so, whether it
Díez Sastre (n 6), 401.16
See M Azpitarte Sánchez, Cambiar el pasado (Tecnos 2008); M Vaquer Caballería, La eficacia
territorial y temporal de las normas (Tirant lo Blanch 2010).
17
Act of 17 July 1958, on Administrative Procedure (Official Journal No. 171, of 18 July 1958, 1275-
1287) (Act of 17 July 1958), arts 109-112. They were replaced, first, by Act No. 30/1992 (n 8), arts
18
102-106, and later by Act No. 39/2015, of 1 October 2015, on Common Administrative Procedure
(Official Journal No. 236, of 2 October 2015, 89343-89410) (Act No. 39/2015), arts 106-111.
For a view of general administrative law statutes as an expression of legislative balancing among
competing constitutional principles, where the latter operate through the former, see
19
F Wollenschläger, ‘Verfassung im Allgemeinem Verwaltungsrecht: Bedeutungsverlust durch
Europäisierung und Emanzipation?’ (2016) 75 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der
Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 184, 199-200; and L Arroyo Jiménez, ‘Derecho administrativo y
Constitución Española’ (2019) 209 Revista de Administración Pública 155 (Arroyo Jiménez).
LM Díez-Picazo, ‘La doctrina del precedente administrativo’ (1982) 98 Revista de Administración
Pública 7, 7-46; Díez Sastre (n 6), 226-238.
20
Díez Sastre (n 6), 381-382.21
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has led to a higher or lower degree of legal protection of legitimate expectations
generated by previous decisions of public authorities.
3. Legitimate expectations and individual
administrative decisions
Legitimate expectations can be threatened and frustrated by
individual decisions of administrative authorities. This can occur in two different
types of cases, traditionally distinguished in general administrative law. First,
rectification or withdrawal of previous administrative acts, and second, departure
from individual representations and other previous non-binding administrative
action (section 3.3). In turn, the first scenario can arise in different forms and
thus various regimes may apply. Like other administrative legal orders,22
Spanish administrative law has different rules for rectification or withdrawal
of previous individual decisions in view of two peculiar features of the latter,
namely whether their content is favourable or adverse for their addressee, and
whether they are lawful or unlawful. The implementation of these criteria give
rise to different situations that are subject to a distinct legal regime: rectification
and withdrawal of unlawful and favourable administrative acts (section 3.1), of
lawful and favourable administrative acts (section 3.2), and of adverse – both
lawful and unlawful – administrative acts. As the latter situation is not relevant
in terms of protection of legitimate expectations, we will focus on the other.
Finally, a part of this article will be devoted to a special case of unlawful and
favourable acts: State aid that has to be recovered pursuant to a Commission
Decision ruling that it was unlawfully granted (section 3.4).
3.1. Rectification and withdrawal of unlawful and favourable
administrative acts
The first of these situations is rectification or withdrawal of
unlawful and favorable acts. Under EU law, the principle of legitimate expecta-
tions qualifies the principle of legality, by restricting both administrative and
judicial revocation of unlawful decisions. The Court of Justice has designed a
balancing test which looks at the time that has elapsed between the initial act
and its rectification or withdrawal, the discernibility of the illegality, the beha-
viour of the addressee, and the effective emergence of legitimate expectations.23
For a comprehensive review of eight EU Member States, see A Glaser, Die Entwicklung des
Europäischen Verwaltungsrechts aus der Perspective der Handlungsgormenlehre (Mohr Siebeck
2013).
22
Cases 7/56 and 3-7/57, Algera v Common Assembly [1957] ECR 39 (Algera v Common Assembly);
Joined cases 42 and 49/59 SNUPAT v High Authority [1961] ECR 53; Case 14/61 Hoogovens v
23
High Authority [1962] ECR 253; Case C-14/181 Alpha Steel v Commission [1982] ECR 749; Case
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Conditions imposed on retroactive revocation are stricter than those on prospec-
tive revocation. If there is a breach of the principle, under EU law an annulment
action can be brought, but compensation claims are not possible.
Spanish administrative law has had a specific regulation on revocation of
unlawful and favourable acts – including administrative decisions with mixed
or double effects24 – since the 1958 Administrative Procedure Act. At present
it can be found in Articles 106 and 107 of the 2015 Administrative Procedure
Act. The starting point in positive law shows that there is a sharp distinction
between ordinary and extraordinary grounds of illegality. This is notably different
to EU law, which provides for a common balancing test irrespective of the ser-
iousness of the illegality, while only discernibility might be of relevance.25
In Spain, factual and legal errors that lead to the invalidity of an individual
administrative decision belong, by default, to the first category (anulabilidad,
or nulidad relativa). Legal certainty, and particularly legitimate expectations
created by this first type of administrative decisions, are protected in a very ro-
bust manner: they cannot be revoked by the administrative authorities that
made them. Instead, the authorities that adopted those acts have to challenge
them before a court within a four-year period, thus seeking judicial review of
their own decisions.26 In turn, individuals or firms affected or harmed by them
have to lodge their actions of annulment within two months.27
Rectification or withdrawal may be ordered by an administrative authority
only when there are particularly serious and manifest grounds of illegality
(nulidad absoluta), that are specifically provided for by the law, such as violation
of fundamental rights, manifest lack of competence, criminal offence, and so
on.28 Furthermore, this may be decided only after implementing a very detailed
and complex administrative procedure that requires a favourable opinion from
an independent consultative body (Consejo de Estado) regarding the existence
of those serious grounds of illegality.29 Finally, even if all these requirements
are met, a favourable administrative act can only be modified or withdrawn
within a reasonable period of time.30 The Supreme Court interprets this limita-
12/85 Consorzio Cooperative d’Abruzzo v Commission [1987] ECR 1005; Case C-90/95, P Henri
de Compte v European parliament [1997] ECRI-1999.
M Sánchez Morón, Derecho administrativo. Parte General (Tecnos 2016) (Sánchez Morón), 582.24
P Craig, EU Administrative Law (3rd edn, OUP 2018) (Craig), 615-616.25
Act No. 39/2015 (n 18), art 107.26
Act No. 29/1998, of 13 July (Official Journal No. 167, of 14 July), art 46(1).27
Act No. 39/2015 (n 18), art 47(1).28
ibid art 106(1).29
ibid art 110.30
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tion according to the particular circumstances of the case and in a rather flexible
manner, implementing it only when the authority revoked a previous decision
after a very long period of time.31
The principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations do not only
limit the cases when administrative acts can be rectified or withdrawn. Rather,
they can also qualify the content and effects of the withdrawal decision, from
two different perspectives. On the one hand, since 1958,32 our different Admin-
istrative Procedure Acts have established that the power to withdraw may not
be exercised when, in view of the circumstances at stake, «this would be contrary
to equity, good faith, the right of individuals or the law».33 Courts often use this
provision in order to decide not to order revocation – as has been said, for ex-
ample, if a long period of time had passed. What they do not do is invoke it in
order to qualify the annulment effects. Judicial annulments of administrative
acts which are disputed on ordinary grounds of illegality always have mere
prospective effect (ex nunc). Therefore, the legal effects of the decision between
the enactment and the annulment of the act would be maintained. In turn, both
judicial and administrative annulment of administrative acts incurring in serious
and obvious grounds of illegality has retroactive effect (ex tunc), which means
that there would no longer be any legal effects of the decision between the en-
actment and the annulment of the act.34
Some authors have argued that the said general provision can be construed
as allowing the granting, if the circumstances of the case require legitimate
expectations to be protected, of only prospective effects to the annulment of a
favourable, unlawful administrative decision, even if it presents a particularly
serious and manifest illegality.35 This would also be in line with the case law of
the Court of Justice, which implements a balancing test that imposes more
strict conditions for allowing retroactive revocation than for prospective revoca-
tion.36 Spanish courts, in turn, acknowledge a strict connection between nulidad
absoluta and retroactivity. If it is found that the legal status quo created by the
Judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of 23 October 2000
(RJ 2000/9001) – four years, of 30 September 2009 (RJ 2010/937) – 20 years; and of 19 Feb-
ruary 2014 (2014/1650) – 10 years.
31
Act of 17 July 1958 (n 18), art 112.32
Act No. 39/2015 (n 18), art 110.33
Judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of 26 September
1988 (RJ 1988/7262); of 28 November 1989 (RJ 1989/8359); of 20 March 1990 (RJ 1990/2243);
34
of March 1998 (RJ 1998/1885); of 2 March 2015 (RJ 2015/1782). See J García Luengo, La nulidad
de pleno Derecho de los actos administrativos (Civitas 2002); T Cano Campos, ‘El laberinto de la
invalidez: algunas pistas para no perderse’ (2017) 4 InDret 10.
Sánchez Morón (n 24), 584.35
Craig (n 25), 618.36
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administrative act must be maintained, the annulment will be rejected altogeth-
er.37 Therefore, that provision is implemented in an all-or-nothing manner:
either declaring the act valid, if courts believe that legal certainty must prevail
over the principle of legality, or annulling it with retroactive effect, if the opposite
is true. It is uncertain whether this case law grants more or less protection to
those who have legitimate expectations. What is apparent though is that it leads
to an overly rigid and crude solution.
There is a second perspective on how legal certainty and legitimate expecta-
tions can qualify the effects of a revocation decision. Since the 1992 Adminis-
trative Procedure Act,38 if the circumstances of the case require it, the adminis-
trative authority may annul a favourable, unlawful decision that it had previously
taken, while granting damages to its beneficiary.39 This is another important
difference when compared to EU law, where legitimate expectations are protected
vis-à-vis revocation exclusively by annulment actions. Nevertheless, in order to
decide when a claim for damages should be upheld, Spanish courts apply three
criteria that have been traditionally connected to the principle of legitimate ex-
pectations in EU law and other national administrative legal orders. First, they
assess how serious and manifest the illegality was, because if it was readily ap-
parent that the previous administrative decision was illegal, there are no legiti-
mate expectations to protect at all:
‘The fact that the illegality [of the subsidy] was so obvious, as well as the lack
of any previous administrative procedure, force us to reject that the administra-
tive withdrawal of the granting decision may have violated the principles of
good faith or legitimate expectations’.40
This criterion makes it very difficult to grant damages in cases concerning
administrative decisions that withdraw previous favourable acts because, as has
been said, for that to be possible, the latter have to show there is a particularly
serious and obvious illegality. Therefore, damages provided for in Article 110.4
of Act No. 39/2015 of 1 October 2015 will normally be granted by a court in a
judicial review procedure, and not by an administrative authority in the context
of a revocation procedure. The second criterion relates to the role played by the
beneficiary of the act in its illegality: if the factual or legal error was provoked
by the beneficiary, she will not be entitled to make a damages claim. There are
Judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of 4 May 2017
(RJ 2017/2415); of 11 January 2017 (RJ 2017/42); and of 22 May 2019 (RJ 2019/2090).
37
Act No. 30/1992 (n 8), art 102(4).38
Act No. 39/2015 (n 18), art 110(4).39
RJ 2017/2415 (n 37), para 9.40
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simply no legitimate expectations to protect in this case.41 Finally, for compen-
sation to be granted, the beneficiary must have actually made an investment in
the belief that the legal status quo created by the administrative act would be
mantained. As a matter of fact, under the principle of legitimate expectations,
the damages that have to be paid are only damages directly linked with those
investments and expenses, as well as with the loss of profit related to business
opportunities that were rejected because the beneficiary trusted in the legality
of the previous decision – often called ‘the negative interest’.42
3.2. Rectification and withdrawal of lawful and favourable
administrative acts
The degree of protection of legitimate expectations is greater
in this scenario because, as the previous administrative act is lawful, the loss
of legitimate expectations is not justified by the principle of legality. There are
four different categories of cases to be distinguished under Spanish law.
The principle of legitimate expectations does not provide for annulment
actions, nor for damages, in the first of them: when the favourable act is revoked
by the administrative authority because the rights-holder no longer complies
with the legal conditions.43 The revocation of the right would be mandatory if
compliance with those conditions was required by the law, and merely facultative
if they were imposed in the administrative act on the basis of a discretionary
power. The rights-holder will not have a right to be compensated in any of these
cases, because she could not expect to continue to exercise the right without
complying with the conditions established by the law or the decision granting
it.44 The same happens in the second category of cases: when the right was
granted under the condition of possible revocation, something that can only
happen if the conferral of the right was itself a discretional prerogative.45 Again,
the rights-holder cannot argue that she reasonably relied on the stability of the
Craig (n 25), 613-618.41
The concept was developed by R von Jehring, ‘Culpa in contrahendo, oder Schadensersatz bei
nichtigen oder nicht zur Perfection gelangten Verträgen’ (1861) 4 Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik
42
des heutigen römischen und deutschen Privatrechts 1; see also F Kessler, ‘Culpa in Contrahendo,
Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study’ (1964) 77 Harvard
Law Review 401. As for its reception in Spain, see Medina Alcoz (n 11).
Craig (n 25), 610-611.43
Act No. 1/2001, of 20 July, on Waters (Official Journal No. 176, of 24 July) (Act No. 1/2001),
art 105(3); Sánchez Morón (n 24), 587.
44
Judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of 7 June 1999
(RJ 1999/4264); and of 23 December 2010 (RJ 2011/1033).
45
Review of European Administrative Law 2020-266
ARROYO JIMÉNEZ AND DOMÉNECH PASCUAL
legal situation created by the administrative act, because it was precarious from
the outset.46
In the third category, in certain areas of administrative law, revocation is
allowed in emergency situations,47 namely when new external circumstances
arise, under which the right would have not been granted ex ante, either because
the law would have prohibited it, or because the application would have been
rejected on a discretional basis. Compensation is generally excluded here,48
normally by virtue of the fiction that the right was granted under a tacit rebus
sic stantibus condition.49 Nevertheless, economic arguments must be of partic-
ular importance given that what it is at stake is whether the risk of possible
emergency situations has to be taken either by the public administration or by
the rights-holder.
Finally, a fourth category of cases is that of rectification or withdrawal of
lawful and favourable acts as a consequence of a new administrative assessment
of the relevant public interest needs. Under EU law, revocation of these admin-
istrative decisions is generally forbidden.50 Likewise, revocation is not allowed
under Spanish law on a general basis, but only if expressly provided for by the
law.51 Furthermore, when this is the case, compensation is definitely required
by the courts.52 The constitutional basis of compensation in these cases is not
the principle of legal certainty, under which the frustration of legitimate expec-
tations would give rise to compensation for damages,53 but rather the right to
private property, because these cases of revocation are considered to be expro-
priations.54 Indeed, under Spanish public law, the prerogative of expropriation
can be exercised to take, not only real property, but any kind of property right.
Accordingly, general administrative law statutes regulate the expropriation of
administrative rights conferred by authorisations, concessions, and waivers.55
F Velasco Caballero, Las cláusulas accesorias de acto administrativo (Tecnos 1996) (Velasco
Caballero), 262.
46
Act No. 1/2001 (n 44), art 104.47
Sánchez Morón (n 24), 587.48
Velasco Caballero (n 46), 287-291.49
Algera v Common Assembly (n 23). See Craig (n 25), 612-613, 636-639.50
Act No. 1/2001 (n 44), art 65(3) and Act No. 22/1988, of 28 July, on Coastline Protection (Official
Journal No. 181, of 29 July), art 77.
51
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of 18 March 1993
(RJ 1993/1773); and of 22 September 1999 (RJ 1999/6589).
52
Spanish Constitution (n 12), arts 9(3) and 106(2).53
ibid, arts 33(1) and 33(3).54
Act of 16 December 1954 (Official Journal No. 351, of 17 December), art 41.55
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Interestingly enough, the fact that Spanish administrative law rationalises
the right to be compensated within the conceptual and legal framework provided
for by the law of expropriation, and not under the principle of legitimate expec-
tations, confers a more robust protection upon the rights-holder. The reason is
that the former guarantees the granting of complete compensation in the
amount of both the actual damages and the loss of profit, whereas the latter
only grants compensation for the negative interest, which excludes most future
profits.56 In sum, legitimate expectations are better preserved outside the realm
of the EU law principle that requires their protection. This also shows that
Europeanisation of national administrative legal orders can lead to a lower level
of protection of the interests that lie behind that principle.
3.3. Departure from previous non-binding administrative action
A third situation arises in cases of departure from individual
representations,57 and other forms of self-limitation of administrative authorities
(Selbstbindung), namely frustration of non-binding promises, departure from
the criteria expressed in answers previously given by the public administration
to a question referred by an individual or firm, and violation of administrative
precedents. All these situations have a common structure that brings them
under the light of the principle of legitimate expectations, both in EU58 and in
Spanish law.59
First, the previous administrative action gives rise to a legitimate expectation
of future administrative behaviour of a particular individual or firm. It can be
a promise made by the authority, an answer given in the context of a question
referred by individuals or firms, or an administrative practice that has consist-
ently been followed in the past. For a legitimate expectation to arise, what is
relevant is not the subjective trust of the individual or firm, but rather the exist-
ence of objective criteria that could plausibly lead to such trust and reliance
existing.60 Thus, the fact that the administrative precedent follows a criterion
expressed in a soft law instrument might lead to this conclusion. Although it
cannot be completely excluded,61 legitimate expectations only seldom arise from
simple administrative inactivity, because these objective criteria normally require
Craig (n 43).56
ibid 619-625.57
Craig (n 25), 619-625.58
Díez Sastre (n 6), 383.59
ibid 383-385.60
Case 223/85 Rijn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV) Machinefabrieken en Scheepswerven NV v Commission
[1987] ECR I-4617. Thomas (n 1), 54-55.
61
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external signs that be sufficiently conclusive,62 if not unconditional, consistent
and precise information.63 Simple tolerance of the authorities with a manifestly
illegal conduct would not give rise to protected legitmate expectations.64 Unlike
EU law, where unlawful representations are not protected under any circum-
stance,65 Spanish law follows here the same criterion that applies to unlawful
decisions: if the representation made to the individual was manifestly unlawful,
it would not give rise to a legitimate expectation, while, if the illegality was not
easy discernible, this is not excluded. Secondly, the previous action has no legally
binding force vis-à-vis the administrative authority, whose subsequent action
is not invalid simply because it disregards it. Otherwise, the principle of legality
would provide for an action of annulment, and there would be no room left for
the principle of legitimate expectations.66 Finally, subsequent action that deviates
from the announced or implied administrative behaviour must actually frustrate
these legitimate expectations. Again, this means that the individual or firm
must have actually made some investment or otherwise shown through her
conduct that she actually relied on the promised, announced or implied admin-
istrative behaviour.67
A good example of this can be found in the traditional case law of the Su-
preme Court on administrative consultations in the area of land development.
Individuals and firms usually hold consultations with the municipal authorities
before purchasing properties or investing in development projects, in order to
learn the current legal status of the property or the way in which the authority
will exercise its discretion in the future. Unlike what happens in other areas of
law – such as tax law, the answers given to these consultations are not binding,
so the municipal authority can disregard them if they were wrong, and even if
it decides to use its discretion differently. In that case, a subsequent adminis-
trative act will not be illegal just because it does not follow them.68 However,
if this happens, the individual or firm can claim compensation for damages
Díez Sastre (n 6), 384.62
Cases T-273/01 Innova Privat-Akademie v Commission [2003] ECR II-1093, para 26; and T-
290/97 Mehibas Dordtselaan v Commission [2000] ECR II-15, para 59; and T387/09 Applied
Microengineering Ltd v Commission EU:T:2012:501, para 61.
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Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of 8 July 2002
(RJ 2002/7277).
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Cases 5/82 Hauptzollamt Krefeld v Maizena GmbH [1982] ECR 4601, para 22; Case T–2/93
Societe Anonyme a Participation Ouvriere Compagnie Nationale Air France v Commission [1994]
ECR II–323, para. 102. Thomas (n 1), 62; Craig (n 25), 639-641.
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Medina Alcoz (n 11).66
Díez Sastre (n 6), 385-386.67
Judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of 11 May 1978 (RJ
1978/2666); of 11 December 1978 (1978/4567); and of 10 April 2000 (RJ 2000/4931).
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directly caused by the response of the administrative authority.69 Compensation
would only cover damages actually suffered by the claimant in view of the in-
vestments that she had made, but no loss of profit. In the words of the Supreme
Court:
«Answers given to consultations on land development issues do not bind
the municipality who has given them, so that the individual has no right to get
a licence according to them, [nor can he seek] the annulment of the subsequent
administrative decision that disregards their content. In spite of this, the indi-
vidual does have a right to be compensated for the damages suffered because
of them, such as the cost of the projects that might have been drafted following
the consultation».70
This was already a well-established doctrine before the accession of Spain
to the European Communities, and its content has remained untouched after
the formal adoption of the principle of legitimate expectations in 1989 through
case law, and in 1999 by the Administrative Procedure Act. In the past, it was
based directly on the principle of extracontractual liability of administrative
authorities.71 Interestingly enough, this has always led to the same outcome
that should be implemented under the principle of legitimate expectations be-
cause, as has been said, the latter provides a legal basis for compensating the
negative interest, excluding any loss of profit related to the future exercise of
the right.72 In sum, Spanish administrative law had already provided for the
same solution, which has not been influenced in any relevant respect by the
formal incorporation of the EU law principle of legitimate expectations.
3.4. Non-fiscal State aid recovery
Finally, a remark must be made about a special case of with-
drawal of unlawful, favourable administrative acts where the influence of EU
law has been particularly acute - and not precisely in line with the protection
of legitimate expectations. The enforcement of Commission Decisions declaring
a subsidy granted by an administrative act to be incompatible with the internal
Judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of 7 February 1978
(RJ 1978/582); of 3 July 1978 (RJ 1978/2835); and of 29 October 1980 (RJ 1980/3459).
69
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of 30 July 1986
(RJ 1986/7053), para. 2. This is now explicitly established by Legislative Decree 7/2015, of
70
30 October 2015, on Land Law (Official Journal No. 261, of 31 October 2015, 103232-103290),
art 13(2) a).
Spanish Constitution (n 12), art 33(3).71
Craig (n 43).72
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market has been always problematic in Spain.73 According to the general view,
before ordering the recovery of the subsidy, the administrative act had to first
be formally annulled by the administrative authority. And this was not easy
because under Spanish administrative law,74 favourable administrative acts,
such as those granting a subsidy and other State aid to an individual or firm,
can only be withdrawn by the authority that adopted them if the ground of ille-
gality was particularly serious and manifest, and after having implemented a
particularly detailed administrative procedure.
These substantive and procedural conditions are aimed at protecting the
stability of favourable administrative acts against an administrative declaration
of invalidity, and therefore they protect the interest that lies behind the principle
of legitimate expectations. But at the same time they have been hindering the
effectiveness of Commission Decisions, and have been partly responsible for
enforcement shortcomings. In this case, EU law did not promote, but rather
opposed legal certainty, legitimate expectations and the protection of legal status
quo. In order to comply with the primacy of Commission Decisions, national
law on subsidies was modified to make it clear that State aid can be recovered
following a Commission Decision whether or not the act granting State aid was
being annulled. Since 2003, the Spanish Act on Subsidies states that:
‘The amounts received will be reimbursed, together with the corresponding
interest from the moment of the payment of the subsidy until the date on which
the reimbursement is agreed, in the following cases: […] h) The adoption of a
recovery order according to the provisions of Articles 87 to 89 of the Treaty on
European Union [current Articles 107 to 109 TFEU]’.75
Since then, Spanish courts have been able to apply this specific provision
of domestic law in order to recover illegal State aid, particularly non-fiscal State
aid granted by individual administrative acts. If there is a Commission Decision
declaring the illegality of the subsidy, it is no longer required that the adminis-
trative act be annulled. This is an exception to the general rule provided for by
our Administrative Procedure Act,76 and it is readily apparent that it does not
contribute to a more robust protection of legitimate expectations.
See L Arroyo Jiménez and P Pérez Fernández, ‘Private Enforcement in Spain’ in W Wurmnest,
F Wollenschläger and T Möllers (eds), Private Enforcement of European Competition and State
Aid Law: Current Challenges and the Way Forward (Kluwer Law 2020) forthcoming.
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4. Legitimate expectations and legislative and
administrative rules
4.1. The old approach: a narrow interpretation of the non-retro-
activity principle
Article 9.3 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution establishes the
‘principle of non-retroactivity’ of both ‘non-favourable sanctioning provisions’,
and provisions ‘restricting individual rights’. The first instance of this non-ret-
roactivity principle is a fundamental piece of modern criminal law that has not
raised many questions. The second one, by contrast, has given rise to a number
of controversies, in that the meaning of the expressions ‘retroactivity’, ‘rights’,
and ‘individual’ not being clear at all.
During its earliest years (1981-1987), the Spanish Constitutional Court inter-
preted the second instance in a very narrow sense. Firstly, the Court distin-
guished different degrees of retroactivity (maximum, medium, and minimum),
and declared that only the maximum retroactivity was constitutionally forbidden.
According to this interpretation, the prohibition of retroactivity would apply
only to those events and legal effects that were already concluded when the new
legislation entered into force. In turn, it would not apply to future legal effects
of decisions made before the new legislation was passed.77 Secondly, the Con-
stitutional Court declared that ‘rights’, in the sense of Article 9.3 of the Consti-
tution, did not include ‘mere legitimate expectations’ (expectativas legítimas),
nor ‘eventual, conditioned or future rights’, but only ‘vested rights’, namely
rights that were already ‘acquired and consolidated’ before the new legislation
was passed.78 Thirdly, the Court considered that the expression ‘individual
rights’ covered only a few core human rights, namely those enshrined in Articles
15-29 of the Constitution, but not economic or social rights, provided for in
Articles 30-52 – for example, the right to private property (Article 33), and the
freedom to conduct a business (Article 38).79 This meant, for instance, that the
resulting ‘non-retroactivity principle’ did not apply to economic regulation, nor
to commercial and tax law. According to this early case law, it seemed that there
were no constitutional limits to retrospective legislation in these and in other
fields.
This interpretation was hard to accept, in particular after Spain joined the
European Communities in 1986. Firstly, this was because retrospective legisla-
See, eg, Judgments of the Constitutional Court No. 27/1981, of 20 July; No. 42/1986, of 10 April
(Judgment No. 42/1986); and No. 65/1987, of 21 May.
77
See, eg, Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 99/1987, of 24 May.78
See, eg, Judgment No. 42/1986 (n 78).79
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tion might be extremely damaging in those fields, by substantially increasing
the costs of and thereby adversely affecting investments, transactions and de-
cisions made before that legislation had been passed. Secondly, in 1987 the
European Court of Justice (as it was then known) had already delivered several
judgments declaring that the application of retrospective rules in the abovemen-
tioned areas could violate Community law – in particular the general principles
of legal certainty and legitimate expectations.80 Thirdly, at that time, the Consti-
tutional and Supreme Courts of other European countries had also established
a similar legal doctrine. Lastly, as we will see in the following, the principle of
legal certainty was and still is enshrined in the Spanish Constitution of 1978.
4.2. The new approach: legal certainty to limit retroactivity
It is not sheer chance that the Spanish Constitutional Court
adopted a new approach to the retroactivity issue in 1987. As paradoxical as it
may sound, the Constitutional Court did so not by changing its previous con-
struction of the ‘principle of non-retroactivity’, but by declaring that some ret-
roactive rules, although not incompatible with this constitutional provision,
might violate other constitutional principles and, in particular, that of legal
certainty, which is also explicitly mentioned by Article 9.3 of the Constitution.
This legal doctrine was first established by Judgment No. 126/1987 of
16 July.81 The Constitutional Court reviewed a legislative rule that had increased
the tax to be paid for some gambling activities carried out during the year before
the rule was passed. The Court confirmed its previous case-law, by declaring
that the ‘principle of non-retroactivity’ did not apply here, as tax rules were not
provisions ‘restricting individual rights’ in the sense of Article 9.3 of the Con-
stitution. However, the Court also stated that retroactive tax legislation might
be unconstitutional if it violates other constitutional principles and, in particular,
that of legal certainty. In order to justify this statement, the Constitutional
Court – as well as the lower courts that had brought the case before it – explicitly
invoked the case law made in similar cases by the Italian Corte Constituzionale,82
Cases 98/78 Firma A. Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1979] ECR I-69; and 224/82 Meiko-Konser-
venfabrik [1983] ECR I-2539.
80
Nevertheless, this doctrine could already be found in the dissenting opinion of Judge R Gómez-
Ferrer to Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 6/1983, of 4 February.
81
Judgments of the Constitutional Court No. 45/1964, 44/1966, 75/1969 and 54/1980.82
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the German Bundesverfassungsgericht,83 and the Supreme Court of the United
States.84
This doctrine has been confirmed by a number of later judgments on retro-
active legal changes concerning not only taxes,85 but also social security contri-
butions,86 pension plans,87 performance assessment of civil servants,88 urban
planning,89 State aid for investment in renewable energies90 or for housing,91
and economic regulation.92 Ironically, the principle of legal certainty has actually
become more relevant than the ‘principle of non-retroactivity’ in order to review
whether retroactive legislation is unconstitutional or not.
It must be noted that this was not a “dynamic” legal transplant, but a “static”
one. The Spanish Constitutional Court imported that foreign doctrine as it ar-
guably was in 1987 but did not considered how it evolved afterwards. In fact,
since then, the Spanish Court has only twice mentioned the case law of the
abovementiond foreign Courts on this topic. And, in both occasions, it just
quoted the same old decision of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht that it
had already quoted in 1987.93
4.3. The new approach: the balancing test
In Judgment No. 126/1987, the Spanish Constitutional Court
also pointed out that legal certainty did not imply an absolute prohibition on
retroactive legislation, as that prohibition would ‘freeze’ the legal system and
impede social progress. In order to determine whether the retroactive effects
of a legal rule were compatible or not with that principle, a balancing test was
Judgment of 19 December 1961 (BVerfGE 13, 261). On the German case law on this topic at that
time, see K Vogel, ‘Rechtssicherheit und Rückwirkung zwischen Vernunftrecht und Verfas-
sungsrecht’ [1988] Juristen Zeitung 833.
83
United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938); and United
States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981).
84
Judgments of the Constitutional Court No. 182/1997, of 28 October (Judgment No. 182/1997);
No. 150/1990; No. 173/1996, of 31 October (Judgment No. 173/1996); No. 273/2000, of 15 No-
85
vember (Judgment No. 273/2000); No. 231/2001; No. 116/2009, of 18 May (Judgment No.
116/2009); No. 176/2011, of 8 November; and No. 121/2016, of 23 June (Judgment No. 121/2016).
Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 89/2009, of 20 April (Judgment No. 89/2009).86
Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 90/2009, of 20 April.87
Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 26/2016, of 18 February.88
Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 141/2014, of 11 September.89
Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 270/2015, of 17 December (Judgment No. 270/2015).90
Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 51/2018, of 10 May (Judgment No. 51/2018).91
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to be carried out, where several factors, in particular, the ‘degree of retroactivity’
of the considered legal rule, had to be taken into account.
The Spanish Constitutional Court explicitly embraced the distinction made
by its German counterpart between ‘actual’ and ‘apparent’ retroactivity.94 In
the former case, where a legal rule is applied to events that have already been
concluded before it was passed (actual retroactivity), legal certainty will prevail
prima facie, unless qualifying reasons of public interest justify such retroactive
effects. In the latter case, where a rule produces legal effects with respect to
events that have not been concluded yet (apparent retroactivity), protection of
legal certainty is to be balanced with the relevant public interest in altering the
law, with none of them prevailing prima facie over the other. In this particular
case, the Court declared that the legislative provision at issue was not unconsti-
tutional, taking into consideration the following: firstly, that the retrospective
effects of the legislative provision at issue were limited to less than one year;
and, secondly, that the legal change was necessary to ensure the principle of
equality, namely to equate the tax burden on the concerned gambling activities
with that imposed on similar gambling activities.
Subsequent judgments have refined this case-law and, in particular, the
factors to be considered to strike a fair balance between legal certainty (namely
the protection of legitimate expectations) and the public interests that require
retroactivity. One of the most relevant factors in that regard is the foreseeability
of the retrospective legal change. Legitimate expectations on the status quo not
being retrospectively altered deserve protection if, and only if, such legal change
was not foreseeable, meaning that it could not have been foreseen, from the
point of view of a prudent and diligent agent (investor, trader, entrepreneur,
taxpayer, and so on.).95
In order to determine whether the legal change at issue was foreseeable or
not, several circumstances are to be taken into account. Firstly, the nature of
the sector where retrospective legal changes take place. Changes will be more
foreseeable: (i) the more intensely regulated the considered sector is; and (ii) the
more frequently circumstances change in that sector, which in turn makes
legal changes aimed at adapting the law to new circumstances more necessary
and frequent.96
As for the distinction in EU law, see Craig (n 25), 601-607.94
See, eg, Judgment No. 270/2015 (n 90).95
ibid.96
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Secondly, the extent to which new legislation deviates from the apparent
legal status quo is also relevant. If there is no deviation at all, because the new
rule confirms that status quo, one can hardly accept that such rule was unfore-
seeable at the time it was passed. This is what usually happens in cases of leg-
islative validations (‘convalidaciones legislativas’), where the Spanish Parliament
establishes a new law whose content reaffirms that of a previous (for example,
administrative) rule that was illegal because of a mere formal or procedural
defect. Under Spanish law, the previous rule enjoyed a presumption of validity,97
and, de facto, was apparently valid. Therefore, the new legislation that reiterates
the old one is not unforeseeable, and it does not frustrate legitimate expectations
if it retrospectively enters into force when the previous rule did so.98
Another relevant factor is the amount of the costs derived from the retroactive
rule for citizens and undertakings that relied on previous legislation. The
magnitude of retrospective tax increases, for instance, has been a crucial factor
when determining whether they were unconstitutional or not.99
Lastly, the Constitutional Court also considers to what extent specific public
interests require the retroactive application of the rule at issue or, in other words,
the magnitude of the social costs that non-retroactivity implies for those interests.
For instance, in Judgment No. 270/2015 of 17 December, which upheld a sub-
stantial cutback in a very generous aid scheme established for investment in
renewable energies, the Court took into account that such cutback was necessary
to attain an overriding public interest (‘perentorios y superiores intereses públicos’).
That scheme had given rise to a huge tariff deficit of the Spanish electricity
system, which had become financially unsustainable, especially after the 2008
global economic crisis broke out.
One can see that this case-law is, in general terms, quite similar to that es-
tablished on the same topic by other European courts, in particular the Court
of Justice of the European Union100 and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht.101
For individual administrative decisions, see Act No. 39/2015 (n 18), art 39(1).97
See, eg, Judgment No. 182/1997 (n 85); and Judgment No. 273/2000 (n 85) However, Judgment
No. 121/2016 (n 85), declared the retroactive validation of an administrative regulation whose
98
‘nullity was foreseeable’ to be unconstitutional; similarly, Judgment No. 116/2009 (n 85),
quashed the retroactive validation of an administrative regulation that had already been annulled
when the new law was passed.
See Judgment No. 173/1996 (n 85) which declared a legal provision retroactively increasing a
tax by more than 200 percentage points as unconstitutional.
99
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It has been noted, however, that the Spanish case law in this realm is less nu-
anced than those of its counterparts and, moreover, not always fully consistent
with that of the Court of Justice, even where EU law applies.102 Specifically, the
Constitutional Court does not implement the more or less clearly structured
standard of review that can be found in the Court of Justice’s case law.103 It is
arguably still a work in progress.
5. Legitimate expectations and State liability
The Spanish Constitution explicitly provides that the govern-
ment is liable, under certain circumstances, for damages caused either by the
executive branch (Article 106.2) or by the judiciary (Article 121). It does not
specifically refer to the scenario where damages result from legislative action
or inaction. Nonetheless, the Spanish Supreme Court has declared that the
Government might also be held liable for damages caused by the legislative
branch, in two types of cases. Firstly, when the legislature has passed an unlawful
provision, which violates either EU law or the Spanish Constitution. Secondly,
when the legislature has established a provision that, albeit being lawful per se,
imposes a ‘special sacrifice’, namely a ‘disproportionate burden’, upon some
individuals.
5.1. State liability for unlawful legislation
Constitutional Court’s Judgment No. 173/1996 quashed a 1990
law that had established a tax with retroactive effects, thereby violating the
principle of legitimate expectations. At that time, it seemed that most of the
people that had paid that tax were not going to recover it. Indeed, when that
Judgment was published, (i) the five-years limitation period established for re-
questing the refund of overpaid taxes had already expired, and (ii) many courts
and administrative authorities had enacted decisions declaring that such law
was not unconstitutional and, therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to such
refund. These decisions had become unappealable before the Constitutional
Court’s Judgment was published, and could not be reviewed anymore. Article
40.1 of the Organic Act 2/1979 of the Constitutional Court (Ley Orgánica del
Tribunal Constitutional) establishes that judgments declaring the unconstitu-
tionality of laws shall not provide grounds for review cases in which the uncon-
See JF Alenza García, ‘Las energías renovables ante la fugacidad legislativa: la mitificación de
los principios de (in)seguridad jurídica y de (des)confianza legítima’ (2016) 55 Actualidad
102
Jurídica Ambiental, 3-22; Muñoz Machado (n 7); I Revuelta Pérez, ‘Estándar del inversor
prudente y confianza legítima’ (2019) 208 Revista de Administración Pública 403.
Craig (n 25), 603, 607.103
77Review of European Administrative Law 2020-2
THE EUROPEANISATION OF SPANISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
stitutional provisions were applied if these cases ended with unappealable judi-
cial decisions, save criminal proceedings where a criminal or an administrative
sanction was imposed if, as a consequence of the nullity of the unconstitutional
law, the sanction would be reduced, limited or excluded. Moreover, under the
case law of the Spanish Supreme Court, this rule also applies to cases concluded
with administrative decisions, if they were not appealed within the statutory
deadline.
Despite (or precisely because) of that, many taxpayers brought actions against
the State for the damages they have suffered as a result of such unconstitutional
law. Surprisingly enough, the Supreme Court upheld their claims, although
they had gotten an unappealable decision rejecting the overpayment refund or
not even applied for this refund within time. The Court argued that the action
for damages was different from and did not depend on the action for refund.
Affected taxpayers have one year, from the date the judgment annulling the
unconstitutional provision was published, to file a claim for damages.104 Inter-
estingly, the Supreme Court did not invoke the principle of legitimate expecta-
tions to justify this solution, although the unlawful legislation at issue had
breached it.
This case law has been heavily criticized by several authors.105 It has been
argued that such doctrine: (i) offsets, de facto, the effects of administrative and
judicial decisions that are unappealable and to be preserved for the sake of
legal certainty; (ii) contravenes the spirit of the abovementioned Article 40.1 of
the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court; and (iii) gives the opportunity to
obtain a legal remedy to individuals that did not avail themselves in due time
of the legal remedies at their disposal.
The scope of this doctrine has been subsequently restricted. On the one
hand, the Supreme Court declared that it did not applied to: (i) cases where the
unconstitutional provision at issue was annulled by the Constitutional Court
with prospective effects;106 nor to (ii) cases where the legislation was unlawful
as a consequence of breaching EU law. This second rule, nonetheless, was re-
See, for instance, Judgments of the Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of
29 February 2000 (RC 49/1998); of 13 June 2000 (RC 567/1998); and of 15 July 2000
(RC 736/1997).
104
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pealed after the European Court of Justice found that it was contrary to the
principle of equivalence.107
On the other hand, Articles 32 and 34 of Act No 40/2015 have subjected that
State liability to very strict conditions: firstly, claimants have to have previously
exhausted every remedy against the decisions made in application of the unlaw-
ful legislation and, moreover, alleged that such legislation was unconstitutional
or contrary to EU law; secondly, claimants can only be compensated for damages
suffered within a period limitation of five years before the unlawful legislative
provision was declared unconstitutional or contrary to EU law. In addition,
when it comes to breaches of EU law, it is established that: (i) the rule of EU
law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; (ii) the infringe-
ment must be sufficiently serious; and (iii) there must be a direct link between
the infringement and the damage sustained by the injured claimants.108
5.2. State liability for lawful legislation
The leading case on this issue was decided by the Supreme
Court in its Judgment of 5 March 1993.109 The Spanish Parliament had passed
a law providing for certain State aid – mostly tax exemptions – to be granted to
fisheries that would make certain investments. As a result of the Kingdom of
Spain joining the European Communities, by virtue of a previous decision of
the Spanish legislature, that aid scheme had to end. The Supreme Court declared
that the affected firms were entitled to be compensated for the special sacrifice
they suffered as a consequence of that.110
Subsequent case-law consolidated this doctrine. The Judgment of 17 February
1998 was passed on a case where the Balearic Islands Parliament had changed
the legal regime of some pieces of land in order to preserve them from urban
development.111 The Balearic legislature repealed the legal rule allowing devel-
opment of that land for environmental reasons, thereby causing substantial
costs to its owners, some of them being on the verge of developing it, or who
had even already started to do so. After the Constitutional Court declared that
See Case C-118/08 Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales SALv. Administración del Estado
EU:C:2010:39; C Plaza Martín, ‘Member States Liability for Legislative Injustice’ (2010) 3 Review
of European Administrative Law 27.
107
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such legal change was not unconstitutional, the affected owners filed a State
liability claim, which the Supreme Court upheld. In its Judgment of 20 January
1999,112 the Supreme Court resolved a similar case in the same way. The Parlia-
ment of Extremadura had changed the legal regime of some hunting grounds,
making it virtually impossible for their owners to continue to make a profit
from them. In its Judgment of 8 October 1998,113 the Supreme Court considered
a case where the Canary Islands Parliament had imposed a new fuel tax, which
affected existing fuel stocks. Thereafter, the claimant, an oil company, was not
able to raise the price of those stocks when it sold them, given that such price
was set by the Government. As a result, it suffered a substantial loss, insofar
as the sale price was lower than the sum of the purchase price and the new tax.
The Supreme Court declared it was entitled to be compensated for that loss.114
In these and in other analogous cases, the Supreme Court has given three
main reasons in order to justify State liability. Firstly, it refers to the so-called
principle of ‘responsibility of public authorities’ (‘principio de responsabilidad de
los poderes públicos’), enshrined in Article 9.3 of the Constitution. It must be
noted that, in Spanish, the term ‘responsabilidad’ is quite ambiguous, as it
might mean ‘liability’, but also ‘accountability’ or ‘responsibility’. Secondly, the
Court has argued that, if not compensated, that special sacrifice would violate
the principle of equality of citizens before charges levied by the State (Articles
14 and 31.1 of the Constitution). Thirdly, it has invoked the principle of legitimate
expectations in order to support the right to compensation.
It must be noted, however, that the government has rarely been held liable
for such lawful legislative acts. The Supreme Court has dismissed the vast
majority of claims for damages caused by the legislative branch in cases regard-
ing deregulation of burial services,115 regulation of professional services,116
damages caused to some professionals as a consequence of Spain entering the
European Community,117 a ban on advertising visible from public roads,118 civil
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service reforms,119 damages caused to municipalities as a result of a local tax
being abolished,120 a ban on smoking in enclosed public places,121 and more.
The Supreme Court is far from having a systematic doctrine in order to de-
termine whether the State is liable or not for the legislature having placed a
disproportionate burden upon some individuals. Nonetheless, one can notice
that it has used, explicitly or implicitly, two main criteria with that regard. The
first one is whether the legal change was foreseeable from the point of view of
a prudent agent. The second one is the impact of the legal change on the rights
and interests of the affected individuals. Here, the Supreme Court usually has
taken into consideration, inter alia, whether the new legislation contained
transition policies that mitigated its negative effects for the claimants.
This case law deserves to be remarked upon. Firstly, the legislative provisions
that have been reviewed for arguably imposing a special sacrifice also had ret-
roactive effect, insofar as they applied to decisions, such as investments and
acquisitions, made before such provisions were passed. What made these ‘State
liability cases’ different from the ‘retroactivity cases’ considered above was not
the retroactive effects of a legal change, but the remedy the claimants sought
and which the courts eventually granted: either compensation for the losses
caused by that legal change or the annulment of the change. However, neither
Spanish courts nor Spanish legal scholars have yet developed any systematic
and consistent criteria in order to determine in which circumstances one remedy
is preferable to the other.
Secondly, a legislative provision imposing a special sacrifice on particular
individuals might well be deemed an expropriation, as it deprives those indi-
viduals from some rights – development rights, hunting rights, and so on – or
legitimate interests. It must be noted that Spanish legislation defines ‘expropri-
ation’ in a very broad sense, as a ‘singular deprivation from private property,
or other rights or legitimate interests’.122 And, needless to say, under Spanish
law the State may only expropriate rights or legitimate interests if and only if
the affected individuals are provided with fair compensation (Article 33.3 of the
Constitution). However, neither the Spanish Constitutional Court nor the Su-
preme Court have considered those legal provisions as ‘regulatory takings’,
unlike the United States Supreme Court which has done so in analogous cir-
Judgments of the Supreme Court (Administrative Law Chamber) of 5 Mars 1993 (RC 3319/1991);
of 30 November 1993 (RC 2156/1991), and 18 October 1997 (RC 223/1995).
119
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cumstances.123 Those cases have not been framed as ‘expropriation’ cases, but
as ‘liability’ ones.
Thirdly, the Spanish Supreme Court invokes the principle of legitimate ex-
pectations, even noting its EU law source, with the aim to justify a remedy – State
liability for lawful legislation – that can be found in the law of some of its
Member States, but not in EU law itself.124 Indeed, in FIAMM the Court of
Justice considered whether the European Community might be held liable for
damages caused by its lawful conduct.125 After reviewing the principles of the
non-contractual liability of the Community for damages caused by its institu-
tions, the Court stated that:
‘while comparative examination of the Member States’ legal systems enabled
the Court to [ find the] convergence of those legal systems in the establishment
of a principle of liability in the case of unlawful action or an unlawful omission
of the authority, including of a legislative nature, that is in no way the position
as regards the possible existence of a principle of liability in the case of a lawful
act or omission of the public authorities, in particular where it is of a legislative
nature’.126
Therefore, the Court of Justice concluded that:
‘as Community law currently stands, no liability regime exists under which
the Community can incur liability for conduct falling within the sphere of its
legislative competence in a situation where any failure of such conduct to
comply with the WTO agreements cannot be relied upon before the Community
courts’.127
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In Holcim,128 the Court of Justice seemed to leave the door open to the pos-
sibility of the European Union being held liable for lawful acts, had they caused
unusual and special damage. Nonetheless, it did not actually affirm that strict
liability either. The Court of First Instance (the General Court), which does not
close the door to that strict liability either, has defined special damage in, as
that which:
‘affects a particular class of economic operators in a disproportionate manner
by comparison with other operators and unusual damage is that which exceeds
the limits of the economic risks inherent in operating in the sector concerned,
the legislative measure that gave rise to the damage pleaded not being justified
by a general economic interest’.129
In sum, the EU law principle of legitimate expectations has been used by
the Supreme Court in order to support a right to be compensated for damages
caused by lawful parliamentary statutes. This doctrine is controversial in and
of itself, since it might well be argued that a statute imposing a disproportionate
burden on an individual or firm without providing for fair compensation violates
the right to private property (Article 331.1) and the constitutional discipline of
expropriation (Article 33.3). Moreover, it is questionable to invoke EU law for
that purpose, when the existence of such a rule in that legal order has been ex-
pressly rejected by the Court of Justice.
6. Conclusion
It is now time to look back at the research questions of this
article. On a general basis, we observe that the impact of the EU law principle
of legitimate expectations on Spanish administrative law has not been uniform,
but rather differs depending on the area of law. On the other hand, even where
this principle was at stake, EU law has not always pushed towards a more robust
protection of legitimate expectations or – more broadly – of stability of the legal
status quo. Therefore, Europeanisation of Spanish administrative law through
the principle of legitimate expectations has been variable and ambiguous. More
specifically, the following claims can be made.
Firstly, the disparate impact of EU law on different areas of Spanish admin-
istrative law can be partially accounted for in view of whether they are subject
or not to formal legislative codification. On the one hand, such an impact has
Case C-556/14 P Holcim v. European Commission EU:C:2016:207.128
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been low in those realms where there already was a pre-existing set of codified
legislative rules. The most relevant instance is the revocation of favourable ad-
ministrative acts.130 The formal adoption of the principle of legitimate expecta-
tions has not led to a significant transformation of the pre-existing law in this
field, which already provided for a high degree of stability of the rights and in-
terests granted by them. Nevertheless, some exceptions can also be observed.
One is the case law that, under certain circumstances, qualifies revocation of
unlawful and favourable acts by granting compensation to the affected individu-
als. Spanish courts are here applying criteria used by both the Court of Justice
of the European Union and German courts in legitimate expectation-cases.
Another exception is the legislative reform of recovery of subsidies, in order to
make it unnecessary to previously withdraw the granting decision.131 The influ-
ence of EU law here has definitely not increased the degree of protection of le-
gitimate expectations.
On the other hand, the impact of the EU law principle of legitimate expecta-
tions has been generally high where there was no such set of codified rules.
The main examples are the constitutional limits to retroactivity of tax and eco-
nomic legislation, as well as State liability for damages caused by lawful legisla-
tive provisions. In the first case, the Spanish Constitutional Court has imported
a substantial part of the balancing approach used by the Court of Justice of the
European Union and its counterparts of other Member States in order to review
the retroactive effect of legal rules.132 In the second case, the Spanish Supreme
Court has invoked the principle of legitimate expectations as one of the main
arguments supporting the possibility of the government being held liable for
its lawful legislation.133 Interestingly, in doing so, the Supreme Court has gone
far beyond the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which
has considered but not confirmed that strict liability yet, nor even examined
the role that principle might play in that regard. Another relevant area of admin-
istrative law that has not been codified is that composed of situations of self-
limitation of administrative authorities. This has traditionally been dealt with
by Spanish courts.134 The EU law principle of legitimate expectations has not
led to a significant evolution of the relevant case law. But this is probably due
to the fact that the latter already protected legal certainty in a very similar vein – if
not more generously. Hence, national administrative law was already aligned
with EU law in terms of protection of legitimate expectations.
See Section 3(1).130
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Secondly, another hypothesis of this article related to the role of the national
Constitution as a competing driving force of administrative law, next to
Europeanisation. Despite Spanish administrative law being highly constitution-
alised,135 this has not affected the influence of the EU law principle of legitimate
expectations. Hence, retroactivity of legislative and administrative rules is one
of the areas where the Spanish Constitution most resolutely limits and steers
administrative law, and also where EU law has given rise to a most prominent
process of transformation. It can be plausibly argued that, in Spain, constitu-
tionalisation has not been an obstacle for the influence of EU law on adminis-
trative legislation and case law. The reason might be the decisive openness to-
wards external and comparative influences of the Constitution itself, as well as
of public law doctrine created in its interpretation.136
A third suggested criterion pointed at how rigid or flexible both rule-making
and judicial precedent are. Both administrative legislation and case law are
quite flexible in Spain. And this has facilitated the incorporation of impulses
coming from EU law. As for legislation, on the one hand, Act No. 4/1999
modified the 1992 Administrative Procedure Act in order to proclaim protection
of legitimate expectations as a general principle of Spanish administrative law.137
Despite it pushing in the opposite direction, Act No. 38/2003 ended the need
for a previous withdrawal of the granting administrative act, in order to facilitate
the implementation of Commission Decisions ordering the recovery of State
aid.138 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has been eager to modify its case
law in order to implement the doctrine of the Court of Justice, especially when
the latter was seen as being helpful from the perspective of its own agenda.
Again, this has been the case of retroactive legislation, while in the area of rec-
tification or withdrawal of administrative acts the Supreme Court has been
more cautious.
Finally, the Spanish case law on the principle of legitimate expectations is
arguably still a work in progress, for several reasons. Firstly, it is less systematic
and nuanced than that developed with respect to similar problems in other
European legal systems. Secondly, it is not always fully consistent with that of
the Court of Justice, even where EU law applies. Thirdly, it has several loose
ends that need tying up. There is a lack of, for instance, any criteria to determine
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whether, why and when the retroactive effects of legislation are to be annulled,
or they just need to be mitigated by means of compensation. Legal academics
have not been very helpful in that regard. We have here a rather relevant theor-
etical job to be done.
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